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Human Nature
Paul F. Abel
This survey in Christian anthropology
was made as a result of the conviction that
an intensive study in this field is not only
profitable but mandatory, if one is to under
stand the world of selves in which he lives.
The ancient cry of the Hebrew Psalmist,
"What is man?" is contemporary with
every age, for a working theory of human
nature is the prerequisite foundation upon
which one's entire philosophy concerning
man and his relationships depends. "The
accepted psychology of an age writes the
history of that age, for from man's under
standing or misunderstanding of himself
flows his ethics, economics, politics, and
religion."*
This paper embodies a preliminary state
ment of the writer's personal view. It
should be explained that in the course of
future thought and study, the author will
probably find it necessary to make many
additions, subtractions, and revisions. It
follows that the thesis here developed is
essentially exploratory in character. Let it
be said that this exploration follows the
paths blazed by many others, and that it
seeks to evaluate critically and so far as
possible sympathetically the work that is
being done in this field today.
I. The Origin of Man
The first principle of the position result
ing from this investigation is the accept
ance of the Biblical account of man's or
igin as the most accurate and satisfactory
explanation for Christian anthropology.
Such a principle cannot be scientifically de
fended, for it must be admitted that there
is no absolute evidence, empirically speak
ing, concerning the origin of man. What-
* Leslie R. Marston, Youth Speaks! Winona
Lake, Indiana : Light and Life Press, 1939. p. 137.
ever view is held, it must be accepted by
faith�"the evidence of things not seen."
Lecomte du Noiiy traces the two path
ways which eventually lead to a compre
hension of man: (1) the direct road of
revelation, which is independent of ration
al thought, and (2) the strictly rational
and scientific method.* He indicates that it
is only a fortunate few who are able to
accept the first method, whereas the second
is in widespread vogue. The scientific
method, however, requires that the universe
be described as it is perceived and con
ceived by the human mind. In a word, it
results in a subjective idea of the universe
dependent upon rational interpretation of
sensorial data and observations, du Noiiy
significantly states that there
. . . are gaps in the continuity of our mental im
ages of the universe which force us to admit
that the beautiful unity we are striving to demon
strate in nature is nothing more, at the present
time, than a philosophical, one might almost say
sentimental, conviction. Should we ever be able
to demonstrate the reality of this unity, it would
only prove that our human, intuitive concepts
had reached truth directly, before our rational
methods had reached truth directly. . . .*
He then proceeds to admit that, on the
basis of man's present knowledge, namely,
by using the methods which have proved
useful in the interpretation of the inan
imate world, it is impossible to account for
not only the birth of life but also the ap
pearance of the basic substances required
for the building of life�highly dissym-
etrical molecules. Thus, while science de
mands respect, it is a mistake to reverence
its almightiness.* It can therefore be re
peated with emphasis that there is no ab-
Pierre Lecomte du Nouy, Human Destiny.
New York : Longmans, Green and Company, 1948
p. 3.
'Ibid., p. 38.
* Loc. cit. et seq.
HUMAN NATURE 63
solute evidence, empirically speaking, con
cerning the origin of man.
Why is it more difficult to accept the
Genesis record of creation than to attempt
to trace man's history through the ages
until the quest finally stops either through
the sheer exhaustion of attempting to re
construct the past eternities ad infinitum,
or by eventually postulating a Creative
Principle or God behind the process? It is
significant to find the biologist, du Noiiy,
subscribing to a finalistic point of view.
He says, "... we shall use, as a leading
light, a teleological hypothesis, that is, a
finalism with a very ultimate goal, a 'tele-
finalism,' if we may be allowed to coin a
new word."� "An explanation of the evol
ution of life by chance alone is untenable
today.'"
Edwin Lewis makes a theological appli
cation from a similar point of view. The
Christian view of man contradicts the older
naturalistic idea that man is merely the
product of the world system. According
to Christianity, the world exists for man,
and the creative activity of God was in
spired by the ultimate aim of securing man
and bringing him to completion. Thus, man
is more than a mere derivation of imper
sonal mechanisms. "It is the philosophy
which holds that without the mind of man
to appreciate and interpret it, the universe
remains an incomplete fragment.'" Lewis
feels that this view is not out of harmony
with the prevailing scientific theory of the
process whereby man originated, but, he
explains, it interprets the process as in
strumental, not as self-explaining.*
The serious efforts of du Noiiy and
Lewis to harmonize the Christian estimate
of man with modern scientific hypotheses
of evolution are not to be dismissed as
frivolous, du Noiiy, in expressing the view
of the scientist, admits that there is an
inexplicable discontinuity between inor
ganic matter and organic matter; between
'Ibid., p. 52.
�Ibid., p. 43.
* Edwin Lewis, The Faith We Declare. Nash
ville: Cokesbury Press, 1939, p. 34.
*Ibid., pp. 32f.
matter and man with a conscience and
freedom.
Just as there seems to be an intellectually im
passable gap between the reversible "evolution"
of electrons and that of atoms (built of elec
trons) ; between the irreversible evolution of
atoms and that of life (built of atoms) ; so there
seems to be an intellectually impassable gap be
tween the evolution of life and that of man, as
such. Man is still an animal by his very structure.
. . . Nevertheless he has also brought into the
world, from an unknown source, other instincts
and ideas specifically human which have become
overwhelmingly important although contradicting
the first, and it is the development of these ideas,
these new characters which constitutes the present
phase of evolution.*
Hence, he finds that his newly coined term,
telefinalism, which postulates the interven
tion of Idea, Will, supreme Intelligence, or
God, throws a little light on this difficulty
of the transformations which must occur
in the uninterrupted line of man's develop
ment."
Since the views of both Lewis and du
Nouy are predicated upon some concept of
God working in the process, why is it not
just as tenable to accept the creation story
of Genesis? It certainly should be no more
difficult for God to create man instanter
than for him to initiate a process in order
to obtain and develop man. An acceptance
of the Biblical account as historical might
bring the accusation of an unrealistic resort
to the principle of parsimony, or to the
fallacy of causal simplicity; nevertheless,
no more credulity is required to accept it
than to accept the evolutionary view. It
lends greater dignity to man's place in the
universe; it better explains man's relation
ship to God; and it adequately explains
how man came to be a rational and im
mortal being whose life includes moral and
spiritual elements.
II. Adam : The Essence of Human
Nature
The second principle of the position re
sulting from this investigation is that
Adam was created "good," which means
* du Nouy, op. cit., p. 99.
"Ibid., p. 97.
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he was: sinless or holy; integrated or or
ganized; capable of a personal communica
tion and relationship with his Creator;
made in the image of God, with full ca
pacity for rational and moral development;
self-transcending; self-conscious; and self-
determining. Human nature is neither a
dualism nor a monism ; it is a gestalt.
The acceptance of the historicity of the
Genesis account of creation demands a
logical adherence to the further implica
tions of that story. After the six creative
"days" had passed, it is said that God re
viewed his handiwork and saw that it
"was very good."" No one except a rad
ical determinist considers that God is di
rectly responsible for evil; therefore, the
original creation, including man, could not
be other than good.
James Orr warns against putting more
into the original state of man than the
Biblical narrative warrants. Aside from
the implications that Adam named the var
ious animals and efficiently executed his
dominion over the lower creation, there is
no proof in Genesis that he was a being of
advanced intellectual attainments, or that
he possessed any intuitive knowledge of
the arts and sciences. Such a view does not
contradict the position, however, that Adam
had an uncorrupted capacity for knowledge
which has never since been equalled. If it
cannot be said that he was a savage, nei
ther can it be said that he was highly civ
ilized.
It is presumed that man had high and noble
faculties, a pure and harmonious nature, rectitude
of will, capability of understanding his Creator's
instructions, and power to obey them. Beyond that
we need not go."
What was the imago Dei? A further as
sertion of the Genesis record is that man
was created in the image and likeness of
God. This statement at once separates
Adam from all of the prior creation, and
places him on a distinctive level. Niebuhr
is probably correct by assuming that man's
"Genesis 1:31.
"James Orr, The Christian View of God and
the World. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerd-
mans Publishing Company, 1947), p. 186.
self-transcendence and self-consciousness
are integral to the im^go Dei." "Christian
anthropology rests on the conviction that
man is an animal made in the image of
God, which means that he is not an an
imal at all."" In this connection, Brunner
points out that man is in contrast to all the
rest of creation, not because he was created
by and through God, but because he was
created in and for God." Hence he can
only be understood and can only under
stand himself in God. It was because he
bore the image of God that he was thus
Ufted above all other earthly creatures, and
because he was made in that imago, he was
conscious of the fact. Brunner terms this
responsible awareness man's Ansprech-
barkeit�addressability or answerability."
Man is the creaturely counterpart of God's Self-
existence, posited by God Himself; ... the being
created by God to stand 'over-against' Him, who
can reply to God, and who in this answer alone
fulfills�or destroys�the purpose of God's crea
tion."
Stanley R. Hopper maintains that the
doctrine of the image must be regarded in
a personalistic manner or its true meaning
is lost. The person who views reason alone
as the seat of the imago is shortsighted, for
"we are created like God by virtue of our
being created as persons, endowed with a
capacity for good and evil."" But even
more than this is involved in the image;
the climax of the doctrine consists in the
fact that man, as a creature, stands in a
unique relationship of response and re
sponsibility to God." Such a personal rela
tionship would be impossible unless there
were some common point of contact ; unless
" Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of
Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946),
I, 162.
"John S. Whale, Christian Doctrine (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 12.
" H. Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt : A Christian
Anthropology (London: Lutterworth Press,
1939), p. 92.
"Whale, op cit., p. 44.
" Brunner, op. cit., p. 98.
" Stanley Romaine Hopper, The Crisis of Faith
(New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press. 1944)
p. 225.
"Loc. cit.
HUMAN NATURE 65
man was created with a "moral personality
like God himself."*"
What about human freedom? Man's
choices cannot possibly be wholly spontan
eous, for it is difficult to think of moral
responsibility for uncaused choices. On the
other hand, it is just as absurd to speak of
responsibility under a rigid causality. But
it is not impossible to think of something
as causally determined by factors within
itself. Thus, Spinoza pointed out, "free
dom of man consists not in his being unde
termined, but in his being determined by
forces and conditions arising from his own
nature and within himself, as contrasted
with his being determined by something
that coerces him."" Hence human freedom
is a determinism of a kind�a self-deter
minism. This is man's distinctive dignity;
this makes him responsible for his volun
tary acts. Adam, possessing original free
dom in an uncorrupted and undisrupted
state, possessed the maximum power of
self-determination.
But simply to say that man is self-
determining does not completely answer
the question concerning human freedom.
What factors make him self-determining?
At one time it was held that man's intelli
gence or reason wholly governed his pur
posive activity, and that the "will" was the
mental "faculty" largely responsible for
man's choices. The act of willing or mak
ing voluntary choices, however, is a func
tion of the entire human gestalt. It is true
that the volition is largely a complex men
tal factor; nevertheless, it is related to the
entire personality. Even physical states,
such as bodily fatigue, hunger, or desire,
play an important role in volitional activity.
The a priori of human freedom is man's
self-transcendence. It is through this self-
transcendental quality of his nature that
man stands above himself, makes an object
of himself, and has the power of relating
himself. "This power to relate himself is
*'01in Alfred Curtis, The Christian Faith
(New York: Eaton and Mains, 1905), p. 193.
John Herman Randall, Jr., and Justus Bechler,
Philosophy : An Introduction (New York : Barnes
and Noble, Inc., 1942), p. 236.
man's initial freedom."" It is inevitable,
therefore, that the self should seek to relate
itself to some center about which to organ
ize. In his self-transcendence, man discov
ers that he cannot adequately measure him
self by himself, nor can he measure him
self by the world around him. If he seeks
to establish his center in the world, he finds
that his freedom is sapped by causality. If
he tries to make himself the center, he con
verts all values into egoism and finds that
his relationships are fatally introverted.
There is but one alternative left, relating
the self to an other�an Other of eternal
significance." The fact of original sin can
not be understood apart from the a priori
fact of original freedom. Adam, by virtue
of this initial freedom, could either love
and obey God, or he could rebel. Hopper
significantly indicates that original free
dom and original sin are therefore the pos
itive and negative aspects of one and the
same principle � man's essential dignity
under God," Adam could never have
sinned were it not that he bore this dis
tinctively human mark�the image of God.
Is human nature a dualism, a monism, or
a gestalt? The gestalt postulate, the whole
is greater than the sum of its parts, is
applicable to the Christian view of human
life. The parts in this case are the body
and soul, the material and metaphysical as
pects of human nature. There is a unity of
personality in man, however, which is not
explicable merely on the basis of an anal
ysis of these parts. The life of the soul is
not one thing, and the life of the body
something altogether different. The life of
man is not a mere sum, "in which each
item is independent of the others and sim
ply counts for one in making up the sum.""
Both the Hfe of the soul and the life of the
body "are one and the same, i.e., the life of
man as man."** Man is an organized whole,
a configuration, a unity, a person.
** Hopper, op. cit, p. 301.
''Ibid., pp. 300f.
'*Ibid., p. 54.
" Robert S. Woolworth. Contemporary Schools
of Psychology (New York: The Ronald Press
Company, 1931), p. 98.
*� Hopper, op. cit., p. 224.
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Man is not . . . spirit temporarily imprisoned
in flesh, soul miserably tethered to a body, but a
single unitary, body-spirit person made wholly for
God, and therefore finding his wholeness only in
God. It is because that fundamental central rela
tionship to God has broken down that the unity of
spirit and body has also broken down."
Thus Orr is right when he contends that
God never intended that there ever should
be a separation of the parts.** Death is an
unnatural intrusion into the complex whole
ness of human life as the result of sin. The
Christian concept of eternal life can only
be postulated upon the fact of Christ's res
urrection. The resurrection not only sealed
the hope of salvation of the soul, but it
also gave promise to the ultimate redemp
tion of man as a gestalt�soul and body
combined in one personality. Thus the
mere immortality�pure survival�of the
soul does not satisfy a true Christian con
ception of man.
III. Adam : The Fall and Original Sin
The third principle of the position aris
ing from this investigation is the accept
ance of the Biblical account of Adam, his
fall, and original sin, as historical. This
postulate does not mean that the Biblical
account is necessarily literal in every de
tail, but it does mean that the account in
Genesis is historically factual.
A critical examination of the dominant
contemporary view. A great deal has been
written in recent years concerning man's
"fallen" and sinful state. Especially is this
true of the Dialectical theologians.** The
one characteristic of this group of writers
which differs from that of historical or
thodoxy is the fact that the outstanding
present day treatments of the Fall and
Original Sin discard the historical elements
of Adam's Primal Sin, and emphasize
"Herbert H. Farmer, God and Men (New
York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1947), p. 90.
^ James Orr, Sidelights on Christian Doctrine
(New York: A. C. Armstrong and Son, 1909),
p. 84.
^Cf., Brunner, op. cit., pp. 129ff, 145ff, 171f;
Hopper, op. cit., pp. 54f; Niebuhr, op. cit., pp.
276-280.
solely the present "fall" of each person in
dividually.
Since the universality of sin is undeni
able; since mere environmental influence is
insufficient to account for this universality;
there must be something intrinsic to the
human situation which gives rise to the
"original sin" of each individual. Paul S.
Rees has succinctly summarized Niebuhr's
essential position in this regard as follows:
It is not a sin to be finite, but to be finite is
to be a sinner.*" As was shown in a pre
vious chapter, Niebuhr feels that the
very anxiety of the human situation �
man's ability to transcend his immediate
situation, whereby he sees its ultimate
meaning; yet his inevitable involvement in
that situation�necessarily predetermines
the "fall" of each person. Creature that he
is, man attempts to construct his own
world-meaning and sets his selfish will
against the will of God; he attempts to
transform his dependence into independ
ence; his will lacks the trust necessary to
subject itself to the will of God.'* Thus,
sin inevitably arises from his creaturehood.
Such a view calls for a reinterpretation
of the Biblical narratives. Hence Paul S.
Minear calls attention to the mythopoeical
character of the Fall accounts as follows:
Some of the apocalyptic myths stress the fall
of Adam and Eve from their paradise; some de
scribe the fall of the angels from their heavenly
paradise. . . . the myth gives existential witness
to the consciousness that 'before God, man is al
ways in the wrong.' As objective explanations of
precisely how sin entered into the world, these
tales are patently inadequate. As expressions of
the consciousness that sin has entered, that it ac
tually infects all creation, that sin enters only by
sin, and that it can be overcome only by God's
act� these myths had profound meanings in their
original settings."
Eden is said, therefore, to fit no geo
graphical location; Adam's fall cannot be
marked by any historical calendar. The
Fall does not fit any "aboriginal calamity,"
""Paul S. Rees, "Our Wesleyan Heritage After
Two Centuries," The Asbury Seminarian, III,
(Spring, 1948), p. 9.
"Niebuhr, op. cit., pp. 250ff.
"Paul Sevier Minear, Eyes of Faith (Phila
delphia: The Westminster Press, 1946), p. 245.
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but is a dimension of present human ex
perience. Each person is his own "Adam,"
as are all men solidarily "Adam." "Thus
Paradise before the Fall is not a period of
history, but our 'memory' of a divinely in
tended quality of life, given to us along
with our consciousness of guilt.'"'
It might be questioned, however, wheth
er or not this view of the "pre-fall con
sciousness," the "fall," and "original sin"
does justice to both God and the dignity
of man. If the hypothetical "first Man"
was created for fellowship with God but
could not help repudiating it; if he had a
"memory" of a divinely intended quality of
life, but existentially could be conscious
only of a sense of guilt; can the God who
originally created him in this pathetically
polarized fashion be said to be good, holy,
or just? Is it not a contradiction to say
that God created man for a certain pur
pose, but that existentially that creation de
feated its intent, not through a miscarriage
of the original potentiality, but intrinsically
and inevitably? Except on the basis of a
limited atonement or of universalism, this
view of the human situation is incompat
ible with the Christian view of God.
It might be argued that the revelation of
God through Christ, and the mediation and
reconciliation Christ provided is the way of
escape for man ; that the "Lamb slain from
the foundation of the world" is co-existent
with creation. What about those multitudes
who never have and never will hear of
Christ? Are they to be damned merely be
cause they were intended to be human
beings involved in an inevitable situation of
rebellion against God? Does not such a
view contradict the very concept of human
freedom? If some semblance of human
freedom is not admitted, the a priori of
self-transcendence disappears; and if self-
transcendence is denied, man is merely an
animal, not a man. Hopper maintains that
"the notion of original sin must be under
stood against a prior fact�the fact of
original freedom which it implies."" If
original freedom means, as Hopper defines
" Whale, op. cit., p. 52.
'* Hopper, tip. cit., p. 54.
it, an initial freedom of each man to love
and obey God or to rebel, the human sit
uation does not necessarily pre-condition
or pre-determine man to sin. But if sin is
inevitable and universal as experience, his
torical orthodoxy, and many leading con
temporary theologians attest, hence val
idating the "notion" of original sin; if the
facts of the case point to the "inexplicable
certainty that all men have fallen short of
the glory of God;"�� it must be admitted
that man no longer possesses the full use
of original freedom whereby he is free to
choose otherwise than to rebel. He is not
responsible, therefore, for an individual
"fall," involving an existential and per
sonal "original sin." His sinfulness must
be contingent upon something prior to his
present existence and person; it must be
causally determined. This is exactly the
position to which an historical treatment of
the Fall and Original Sin as found in Gen
esis leads.
Original Sin� the perversion of a virtue.
In treating original sin as an historical act
of Adam, Hopper's statement is appro
priate�"the notion of original sin must be
understood against a prior fact�the fact
of original freedom which it implies," the
initial freedom to be obedient or disobe
dient to God ; to love him or fear him.
Thus, original sin can truly be said to be a
negative assertion of the essential dignity
of man under God. It may be said, there
fore, that evil in the human situation is to
a large extent perverted good, not the pri
vation of good. In a word, original sin rep
resents the negative assertion, not a mere
lack of realization, of that principle in
human nature�freedom�which is intrinsic
to man's dignity under God.
Man was created a free moral agent.
This is the necessary a priori of his self-
transcendence and essential personality.
Such a view is necessary to a proper under
standing of the imago Dei. Hence, no one
can deny that man's freedom was not only
absolutely essential, but also a virtue. It was
at this point, however, that virtue became
a vice, a perverted good. Man used his
Loc. cit.
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freedom to digress from the will of God
and to sever that personal relationship with
God for which he was created. Hence,
Curtis, Niebuhr, Brunner, and a host of
other theologians maintain that personal
sin is basically selfishness and pride�self-
will versus God's will. The original sin was
the misuse of a virtue; it was self-deter
mination perverted.
The only adequate explanation of the
Primal Sin is that Adam and Eve inten
tionally violated God's law by following
self-interest instead of God's mandates.
Curtis supports the contention that evil in
the human situation is misused or perverted
good by pointing out that this first dis
obedience came out of four motives: (1)
physical desire�the fruit was good to eat,
(2) cosmic curiosity�to eat was to become
as wise as God, (3) the personal spring
toward self-assertion�a disobedience to
God's command that the tree be left alone,
and (4) social influence as manifested by
Eve giving of the forbidden fruit to Adam.
Each of these motives is not only good but
absolutely essential to man, but all four
can become evil if and when they urge a
moral person to disobey God."
IV. The Personal and Racial Con
sequences OF Original Sin
Fourth conclusion: The Fall constituted
a personal sin for Adam, and as such had
severe personal consequences, but in addi
tion, this Primal Sin had racial conse
quences which have rendered the whole
race alien from God.
The true effects of the Fall cannot be
fully appreciated aside from some under
standing of both man's constitution and
that of the world in which he lives in re
lation to God's will. E. Stanley Jones
maintains that not only is the true way of
life to be found in the Holy Scriptures,
even though these are of primary import
ance, but the nature of reality supports the
Christian way of life. God proposed to re
deem the world through Christ, but it
should also be remembered that the world
was created through Christ. "Through
" Curtis, op. cit.. p. 197.
him all existence came into being, no exist
ence came into being apart from him.""
"For it was by him that all things were
created both in heaven and on earth, both
the seen and the unseen. . . .'"* Thus the
Kingdom of God is not only manifest
through special revelation, but in a very
real sense, all things have the stamp of
Christ upon them, or at least the signature
of God.'" Christ, therefore, came not only
to reveal God and the purpose of redemp
tion for the soul, but he also came to man
ifest true humanity; the way men were
created to live.
In man's very constitution and nature�
physically, mentally, and spiritually � he
was made by God to be in a personal rela
tionship of dependence upon Him; and
being so constituted, he cannot properly
live or find rest outside of God. Augustine
voiced this same opinion when he said,
"Thou hast made us for thyself, and we
are restless until we rest in Thee." The
will of God is not something other than,
or opposed to your real nature. It is your
real nature.'"" Brunner agrees that God
leaves the imprint of his nature upon what
ever he does; the creation of the world
must be considered a revelation and self-
communication of God." Thus logic com
pels a modification of Barth's animus
against Natural Theology.
The doctrine of predestination�that some are
predestined to heaven and some to hell�has been
rightly thrown out of the window. But does it
now come back again through the door of mani
fest fact? Is there a destiny written into the na
ture of reality, written into our blood, nerves, tis-
"'The New Testament: A New Translation byJames Moffatt. (New edition, revised; NewYork: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1935),John 1:3.
*^Ihid., Colossians 1:16.
'*E. Stanley Jones, The Way (New York- Ab
ingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941), p. 7.
""E. Stanley Jones, Is the Kingdom of God
Realism? (New York: Abingdon-CokesburyPress, 1940), p. 73.
"Heinrich Emil Brunner, Nature and Grace.
(English translation of Natur und Gnade: Zwm
Gesprach mit Karl Barth with the reply, Nein!
by Karl Barth appearing in the one volume en
titled. Natural Theology. London: Goeffrey Bles
Ltd., The Centenary Press, 1946), p. 25.
'
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sues, relationships�into everything? Are we pre
destined by the very nature of things to be Chris
tian? And is that destiny not merely written in
the Bible, but written in us, in the very make-up
of our being?"
The point to be made here is not that
Adam sinned against nature; he sinned
against God and reversed his proper rela
tionship to God; nevertheless, in so doing
he also transgressed the laws of his being.
As a gestalt not one part of his essential
constitution was- left unaffected. Mention
has already been made that death�the un
natural separation of his essential being
into its component parts�was one result of
sin. But not only was death an unnatural
effect ; all sin was contrary to his consti
tution and thus unnatural. In this sense,
when a man sins he not only affects his
relationship to God or his fellows, but he
really militates against himself, for he was
designed for conformity to God's law. This
is but another way of stating that sin is its
own punishment. Adam broke himself
upon the law of God, just as has every
sinner since.
The consequence of Adam's sin, there
fore, was total�that is, it extended to his
total life, and more than that, to the world
over which he had been given dominion.
When he chose to have his wilful way in
preference to the design of God, he dis
rupted the whole of his relationships. Man
is a person who stands at all times in some
relationship to God. Belief or non-belief,
obedience or rebellion may condition that
relationship, but man's relationship to God
never ceases. To the very core and essence
of his being man is related to God, "for
when God creates a man, he creates that
relationship by the same act�without the
relationship there would be no man."** But
mati and his total relationships were wholly
designed for alignment with God's will, and
when man rebelled, the relationship became
a source of oppression. Rather than an
inward fulfillment, the negative relation
ship produced a sense of being ill at ease,
estranged, inwardly outraged, and guilty.
"Jones, The Way, loc. cit.
" Farmer, op. cit., pp. 79f,
Thus rebellion at once brought condemna
tion upon Adam. Sin began to be its own
punishment, for he alienated himself not
only from God, but also from the way he
was made to live. Hence, not only was the
central relationship of his life�his rela
tionship to God � distorted, but he was
caught in a vicious circle�he himself was
undone. He chose to "save his life," and,
behold he had "lost it !"
The result of sin was a tragic blindness.
Adam lost his vision and perspective. No
longer could he see the truth concerning
himself, nor could he discern the true
meaning of his life. He could no longer
know God's will for himself, but was left
a wanderer, out of sorts with God and
with himself.
The . . . reason why sin blinds has to do . . .
with the fact that God's claim upon man is writ
ten into the very constitution of his being�or,
. . . though man can refuse it, he cannot escape
it. He can no more escape it than he can escape
being a man. The claim of God is upon him and
in him all the time�^because he is a man. What
is the result? For the sake of his own peace of
mind there begins in the sinner's mind a process
of disguising from himself the real nature of his
self-centered desires, his refusal of the claim of
God . . . rationalization ....**
Had all of this been limited to himself
the result would have been tragic, but the
consequences of Adam's sin were not mere
ly personal, they were racial. Some doc
trine of solidarity, based upon the headship
of the race in Adam, is necessary to under
stand adequately the transmission of de
pravity arising from the original sin. Such
is the view of Paul, Augustine, Luther,
Calvin, and Wesley. The consequence upon
the race was individually and racially in
herited depravity, which is far from mean
ing that each individual is held culpable
for original sin. Original sin as guilt can
not be transmitted! The Original Sin was
committed once and for all by the repre
sentative of the race�Adam�and the re
sult is not that each person is guilty of that
sin or inherits that sin, rather, he inherits
the result of that sin�alienation and inher
ited depravity. For the purposes of this
� Ibid., p. 85.
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conclusion, this distinction between original
sin and depravity should be borne in mind.
Original sin was the personal sinful act of
Adam, whereas the racial consequences are
expressed in terms of inherited depravity,
which originated in original sin to be sure,
but is not identical with it. It is just as ab
surd to talk about the transmission of orig
inal sin as it is to refer to the atonement
�the act of the New Adam�as transmis
sible to each believer. The act of the atone
ment was completed once and for all. It is
not transmissible from person to person ; it
is the benefit, the result of that completed
act, which is bestowed upon the New Is
rael.
When Adam sinned his communion with
God was severed. It is true that as a man
his relationship to God could not be sev
ered, but it became a relationship of rebel
lion. The place that God should have oc
cupied in man's life was replaced by
egocentricity. Hence, the Spirit of God
was forced to withdraw from man's life.
Much as he might be sorry for his plight,
therefore, man no longer had the power to
live in the state of his original righteous
ness. For, as has been pointed out, man
was constituted within his very nature to
live according to God's will, and in com
munion with him. As Curtis puts it, "man
needs to have for organization the motive
of moral love."^� When man replaced this
motive of moral love with a motive of self-
love, his life lost its center and organizing
principle. His natural tendencies were no
longer united and aligned with God's will,
but were left to their own caprices. Man's
original tendency toward good became a
tendency toward evil, for in this disrupted
state, without God's fellowship as the in
tegrative factor, he was helpless. He could
never bring order out of chaos for he him
self was that chaos.
It is common to refer to various aspects
of Adam's nature as having been lost.
Thus it is said that Adam lost his freedom,
he lost his rational powers, he lost his
moral sense, all involved in the loss of the
image of God. The use of this word "lost"
" Curtis, op. cit., p. 201.
may carry with it unfortunate materialistic
overtones. Adam did not lose any of these
essential elements of his humanity. They
simply lost their original potency because
his nature became disrupted and disinte
grated. They lost "stature" simply because
they served an unworthy purpose�that of
egocentric living. The loss of the imago
was a defacement, not a destruction. The
basic loss, therefore, was that of fellow
ship and communion with God ; the loss of
the Holy Spirit as the true organizing prin
ciple of his nature. The cause of this loss,
his egocentricity, was found to be entirely
insufficient as a replacement, for it was
contrary to his constitutional design.
Adam's broken fellowship was extended
to the whole of the race. Every human be
ing is born with this transcendental rela
tionship to God so distorted by virtue of
Adam's original sin, that aside from re
demption, the true integrative principle of
his life�the Spirit of God�is inaccessible.
In this sense, depravity may be said to be
inherited, for it inevitably results from
man's position under God as an alien.
Why God thus chose to make Adam repre
sentative of the race is in the last analysis
inexplicable, but that he did is the clear
testimony of both the Bible and historic
orthodoxy.
How is depravity transmitted? Sangster
objects to the conception of depravity as a
thing. Paul S. Rees aptly summarizes the
objections of several contemporary writers.
These theologians charge traditional ortho
doxy, especially Wesleyan Arminianism,
with erring by thinking of man's depravity
as a "thing, a quantum, an entity in itself,
which can be removed like a cancer or a bad
tooth."" Modern research in heredity has
exploded the myth of inherited acquired
characteristics. Were depravity an entity,
a "something" positive in the human na
ture, its transmission would be out of the
question.
Curtis explains depravity on the basis of
the unorganized character of the individual
W. E. Sangster, The Path to Perfection
(New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943).
p. 187.
Rees, op. cit., p. 10.
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life. Man possesses all of the native ele
ments of human nature, but they are a
cluster of unrelated items, Man is born
into the world in this inorganic condition.
It was originally intended that man should
be a fully organized individual through a
life of constant personal intimacy with
God; "to have his moral life perfectly sat
urated with that blessed holy fellowship.'"'
Thus it was intended that man should be at
home with God; but this personal vision
and intimacy with God was intercepted and
perverted by the racial representative. The
best organizing principle upon which man
can now build his moral person is con
science, which is altogether inadequate.
Hence, instead of the moral love and fel
lowship which are necessary for man to be
come wholly organized, he lives under
moral fear, realizing his creatureliness and
dependence, yet severed from the source of
life. "No wonder he is afraid all alone out
there under that vast, ever-growing, ab
solutely pitiless moral demand."*'
In this manner the whole race, solidarily
in Adam, was involved in the negation of
the fellowship with God. Hence to be born
a human being means to be born depraved,
for simply to be born a member of the race
is to be born under the negation of com
munion with God, and thus to be disorgan
ized. No acquired characteristics foreign
to original human nature are involved.
Since Adam's descendants are born under
the curse which deprives human nature of
the Spirit of God as its integrating factor,
hereditary depravity "is only the law of
natural heredity, but that law operating
under the . . . consequence of Adam's
sin.""
Curtis, loc. cit.
*^ Loc. cit. et seq.
"H. Orton Wiley, Christian Theology (Kan
sas City: Beacon Hill Press, 1941), II, p. 125.
Why was God thus forced to withdraw
from communion with the race? If the
descendants of Adam are not born actually
sinful; if the guilt of the original sin is
not imputed to them; why should God's
Spirit be withtdrawn from them? This
question involves the holiness, justice, and
love of God, and is related principally to
the doctrine of God and soteriology rather
than to the specific discussion of Christian
anthropology. Curtis finds no other explan
ation for the recession of the divine per
sonal companionship from the race than
the realistic fact of God's hatred for sin.
This hatred is not sentimentality, nor is it
impersonal or arbitrary; it arises from the
very holiness of his being,
... we are to think ... of the law of God's
holiness as plunging eternally into his absolutely
exhaustive self-consciousness, and there furnishing
motive for an active, personal hatred of all sin
as a violation of that fundamental holiness. Thus,
God not only hates sin, but he means to hate it."
Universal sinning is a fact of experience
which cannot be denied. It merely attests
the fact that the fellowship between God
and the race is broken, but does not explain
why. But God did effect a means of rec
onciliation, as will be indicated later. Man
kind, through Adam, had broken that fel
lowship, and man had to restore it. Yet
man in his helpless condition without that
necessary fellowship was caught in a mael
strom from which extrication was impos
sible. Hence God alone was able to pro
vide the means of restoration. The only
answer was the God-man, Christ Jesus.
The fact still stands, however, that racially
this communion is severed, and to be born
into the race is to be dependent upon God
yet in a negative relationship to him.
(To he continued)
" Curtis, op. cit., p. 204.
